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 ABSTRACT 
 
Critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects 
government failure.  In this paper I analyze the effectiveness of foreign 
aid programs to gain insights into political regimes in aid recipient 
countries. My analytical framework shows how three stylized 
political/economic regimes labeled egalitarian, elitist and laissez-faire 
would use foreign aid.  I then test reduced form equations using data on 
nonmilitary aid flows to 96 countries.  I find that models of elitist 
political regimes best predict the impact of foreign aid.  Aid does not 
significantly increase investment and growth, nor benefit the poor as 
measured by improvements in human development indicators, but it does 
increase the size of government.  I also find that the impact of aid does 
not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal 
democratic or highly repressive.  But liberal political regimes and 
democracies, ceteris paribus, have on average 30% lower infant 
mortality than the least free regimes.  This may be due to greater 
empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political 
elite continues to receive the benefits of aid programs.  An implication is 
that short term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a 
more successful means of reducing poverty than current programs.   
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POLITICS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN AID 
 
 Peter Boone 
 
1.  Introduction 
Foreign aid programs were launched long before there was 
compelling theory, or compelling evidence that proved they could work. 
 The stated goal of these programs was to alleviate poverty and promote 
growth.  The massive aid programs that began after the second world 
war, but only took off in the 1960s, are an unprecedented economic 
experiment.  Donors transferred approximately $50 billion of 
nonmilitary aid in 1991 to developing countries, averaging over 8% of 
the recipient country's GNP in 1981-90.  These transfers are highly 
variable (see Figure 1 and Table 1), fungible, and to a large extent 
politically motivated.  The impact of aid can be used as an interesting 
test of alternative theories of development.  Aid can also teach us about 
political regimes in  recipient countries.  In this paper I focus on what 
can be learned about political systems.   
There are several possible channels by which aid could alleviate 
poverty.  The early literature focused on capital market imperfections.  If 
capital is not mobile, poor countries may have a set of profitable 
investment projects that are not undertaken due to a shortage of domestic 
savings.  Low savings may be due to absolute poverty when people have 
minimum subsistence needs.  But a more careful examination makes this 
explanation seem implausible.  Capital markets do function - during the 
last twenty years we have seen extremely large net capital flows to 
developing countries.  Further, the richest 20% of the population earn 
more than 50% of income in developing countries.1  We might instead 
ask the question:  Why does the high income elite choose to invest 
domestically in some countries while in others they don't? 
A second mechanism by which aid leads to growth is through fiscal 
policy.  Barro (1990) presents  an endogenous growth model where a 
benevolent dictator uses distortionary taxation to finance productive 
public expenditures.  The planner chooses the optimal tax rate by 
comparing the social costs of higher taxation to the benefits of more 
public goods.  Barro's model predicts that foreign assistance causes 
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faster growth and higher investment since the social planner can reduce 
distortionary taxes.               
But this mechanism depends critically on the political regime.  The 
most ardent critics of aid programs, especially PT Bauer (1971) and 
Milton Friedman (1958), attack foreign assistance on the grounds that 
politicians will not allocate aid efficiently when measured against the 
goals of aid programs.  They argue that recipient countries will consume 
capital inflows since lack of domestic savings reflects lack of 
opportunities.  The political elite will benefit from aid flows.2 
This paper analyzes the importance of the political regime for the 
effectiveness of aid programs.  Standard categorizations of political 
regimes do not correlate with clear economic regimes.  A simple contrast 
of leaders in East Asia shows that authoritarian regimes/dictatorships can 
be quasi-benevolent such as President Lee of Singapore, or highly rent 
seeking such as President Marcos.  Bayart (1994) lists 10 African 
dictators whom he claims used public office to divert large sums, 
including foreign aid, to their tribe members or clients.3   And elected or 
authoritarian populist regimes, defined as regimes "seeking to mobilize 
and represent the poor",4 also use distortionary policies to redirect funds 
to their supporters.     
In order to relate political regimes to economic systems, I begin by 
categorizing alternative political regimes in terms of the interest groups 
they support.  My approach is motivated by a series of papers by Becker 
(1983, 1985a, 1985b, 1989).  Becker (1983) presents a public choice 
model where a government chooses tax and spending  policies as an 
outcome of strategic interaction between groups that are endowed with 
different political  "influence".  Influence is exogenously endowed to 
citizens.  He argues that in all political regimes each citizen's relative 
influence will vary both for institutional and other reasons.  Democracies 
may allocate influence more evenly across the population, but even so 
people's ability to mobilize support and influence government will still 
depend on other attributes such as education, health, skills and the ability 
to form coalitions. 
 In my framework ruling politicians maximize welfare over a 
weighted sum of citizen's utilities.  Politicians use distortionary taxation 
and foreign aid to finance productive government spending and transfers 
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to their political supporters.   I contrast how foreign aid is used under 
three extreme, alternative political regimes that fall out naturally from 
this framework.  An Elitist government maximizes the welfare of a fixed 
ruling coalition.  Its optimal policy is to transfer foreign aid to a high 
income political elite.  An Egalitarian government maximizes the 
welfare of a fixed group of citizens with relatively low endowments.  Its 
optimal policy is to transfer foreign aid to households with low initial 
endowments.  This should improve poverty indicators.  A Laissez-Faire 
government maximizes the welfare of a minimum (and substantial) 
fraction of the population. Its optimal policy is to use aid to lower 
distortionary taxes.   This leads to higher investment and income.  Only 
the elitist political regime wastes foreign aid as described by Bauer and 
Friedman.   
I then test the reduced form equations from this model using data 
on nonmilitary foreign aid transfers, national accounts, human 
development indicators, and indexes of political liberties and political 
regimes from 97 countries.  I use three alternative instruments, conduct 
instrument specification tests, and examine robustness using alternative 
subsamples and regression techniques.  The previous literature on the 
empirical impact of foreign aid is surprisingly limited.  This may be due 
to the difficulty in finding suitable instruments.  Mosley et al (1986) are 
the closest in spirit to this paper. Using cross country regressions they 
conclude that aid does not raise growth rates.  Papanek (1972) strongly 
criticizes an early literature on the impact of foreign aid.  He describes a 
range of potential problems due to simultaneity and measurement error.  
I will discuss relevant papers in the sections that follow, but other 
general papers on aid include Chenery and Ecksteing (1970), Chenery 
and Syrquin (1975), Griffin (1970), Levy (1987), Levy (1988), Papanek 
(1973), Weisskopf (1972) and Boone (1995).  
My empirical results suggest that elitist regimes best predict the 
impact of aid.  The marginal propensity to consume from aid  is 
insignificantly different from one, and the marginal propensity to invest 
is insignificantly different from zero.  There is one important caveat to 
these findings.  In small countries, or countries where the aid/GNP ratio 
is extremely large (over 15% of GNP) I find that aid does lead to higher 
investment.  This is probably due to the lack of fungibility of aid flows 
  4 
in such countries.  In a small country one dam or large public 
infrastructure project can represent a sizable portion of GNP, and the 
project is unlikely to be fungible.  But in other work not repeated here, 
Boone (1995), and consistent with Mosley et al (1986), I found that in 
all countries there was no significant correlation between aid and 
growth.  This empirical evidence implies capital shortage is not the 
primary cause of poverty in aid recipient countries.  I find no significant 
impact of aid on tax proxies, nor on measures of distortionary policies, 
but I do find that aid increases the size of government.  Government 
consumption rises by approximately three quarters of total aid receipts.  
The main aim of this paper is to examine measures of distribution 
as proxied by human development indicators.   Since infant mortality 
indicators respond quickly to higher consumption and improved health 
services, infant mortality can be considered a "flash" indicator of 
improvements in economic conditions of the poor.  I find no significant 
impact of aid on improvements in infant mortality, primary schooling 
ratios nor life expectancy.  I argue this is strong evidence that aid flows 
primarily benefit a wealthy political elite. 
These results may be biased since I am aggregating a range of 
political regimes.  So in the final set of empirical tests I examine whether 
different political regimes  use aid differently.  I allow for a differential 
impact of aid in liberal democratic regimes and according to a ranking of 
political liberties.  But my empirical results reject the hypothesis that 
democratic/liberal regimes use aid differently.  Under each regime all aid 
is used for consumption, and there is no significant impact of aid on  
human development indicators.   
But there is one important caveat to these findings.  I do find that 
democratic/liberal political regimes, ceteris paribus, have 30% lower 
infant mortality.  I interpret this as evidence that the poor are more 
empowered in these regimes, and this induces governments to provide 
more basic services.   But once conditioning on these different regimes, 
my results suggest that all political systems support a high income 
political elite.  So it is not surprising that aid benefits this elite.     
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 
presents my analytical framework.  Section 3 outlines empirical tests 
based on reduced form equations from this model.  Sections 4, 5 and 6 
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discuss data sources, the determinants of aid flows, and my choice of 
instruments and specification tests respectively.  Section 7 presents 
empirical results using aggregate aid flows, and section 8 allows for 
differences across political regimes.  Section  9 concludes.       
 
2.  Public Choice Under Alternative Political Regimes 
The debate over the effectiveness of foreign aid centers on the role 
of the political regime in causing poverty.  In this section I briefly 
describe a model of political behavior that encompasses cases where aid 
is effective and cases where aid is ineffective, a full derivation of the 
model is given in Appendix 2.  My starting point is to make specific 
assumptions about the goals of a political regime, and I then examine 
economic outcomes and the effectiveness of aid under different regimes. 
 The reduced form equations from this model motivate my empirical 
work. 
I consider a world with many countries all growing at some 
constant rate g along a steady state growth path.  Each country has 
politicians that choose macroeconomic policies to maximize welfare of 
their political elite, and Ramsey style households take these policy 
choices as given when they make optimal consumption and investment 
decisions.  I want to use this framework to examine why some poor 
countries remain relatively poor, and do not grow faster and Acatch-up@ 
to the high income countries, so throughout this section I solve for 
steady-state outcomes and I drop all time subscripts.  I begin by defining 
the politician=s maximization problem, and then I briefly outline familiar 
producer and consumer problems.  In the final subsection I characterize 
predicted effectiveness of aid and the cross section pattern of national 
incomes according to political regime types. 
 
 
 
2.1.  The Politician=s maximization problem 
The political regime is determined by the type and breadth of 
persons that politicians take into account when choosing government 
policies.  In each country the political regime maximizes the welfare of a 
fraction, s*, of the population which from hereon I call the political elite. 
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 The members of the political elite are identical, the total (mass of the) 
population in each country is normalized to equal one, and I=ll index 
each citizen using subscript s over the interval [0,1].  Households differ 
according to their labor endowment, ls , and the sum of all labor is 
normalized to one. 
The role of the government is to finance productive public goods 
but it can also make non-productive transfers to the elite.  Politicians use 
distortionary financing, here a proportional income tax, τ, to raise funds 
to finance public goods, G, and to carry out lump sum and strictly 
positive transfers, ts.  Governments can also receive foreign aid.  In order 
to keep the framework as simple and realistic as possible, I=ll assume this 
aid is fungible and the government can allocate the funds as needed.  I=ll 
also assume that the aid is not conditional,5 so that the policy choices and 
political regime of the nation are not directly affected by aid flows.6  In 
the final subsection and in the empirical parts of this paper I discuss 
some of the implications of introducing conditional aid. 
The problem for the political leader is to maximize weighted sums 
of utility, u(A), of the political elite subject to the government=s budget 
constraint: 
subject to: 
cs:  consumption of individual s 
F:  foreign aid to the government 
G:  expenditures on public goods and services 
Y:  national income excluding foreign aid 
ls:  labor endowment of person s  
ts:  transfer per effective labor unit to person s 
u(c):  utility of person consuming c 
τ:  income tax rate 
s ) cu( (s)    s
1
s1G,,t *s ∂∫ ψτmax  
0  t      s lt =G   F + Y sss
1
0 ≥∂∫τ  
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ψ(s):  political weighting of household s 
 
There are two parameters of this welfare problem that characterize the 
political regime.  First, the value of s* determines the broad-based 
representativeness of the government.  If s* = 1 then the policy maker 
maximizes welfare of the sum of all citizen's utilities.  But as s* 
approaches zero the politician becomes a pure elitist dictator.   
The second factor that determines the regime type is the 
composition of the political elite.  Some people are born lucky with high 
endowments of labor/skills, ls.  An egalitarian regime maximizes the 
welfare of a group with low initial labor endowments, while an elitist 
regime will choose the group independent of its labor supply, or it may 
be composed of only  well endowed citizens.  I assume that the 
government only uses transfers, ts, to target benefits to these political 
supporters, and for convenience I assume it weights all members of this 
elite equally (ψ constant).7,8     
 
2.2.  Households 
The problem facing each household is to choose its consumption 
and savings profile so as  to maximize welfare given the policy 
variables, τ and G, and any transfers they receive.  A typical household s 
produces goods using a Cobb-Douglas bundle of human and physical 
capital and labor: 
where I am assuming that each household benefits from government 
services in proportion to their initial labor endowment.  The parameter A 
captures labor augmenting productivity which grows at rate g.  A profit 
maximizing household will choose physical and human capital so as to 
equate its after tax marginal product of human and physical capital with 
real interest plus depreciation costs. 
To keep the problem simple and familiar I assume households have 
Ramsey-type time separable utility functions with constant discount rate 
δ, and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/σ.  In this framework 
1 = ++       )l(G)l(Ak = y ssss γβαγβα ••  
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the consumer=s euler equation will tie down the real interest rate in the 
steady-state so that: 
We can now combine this condition with the first order conditions 
determining the consumer=s optimal choice of physical and human 
capital inputs to express household income as a function of policy 
variables and exogenous parameters: 
 
The right hand side of (5) shows that steady state household production 
is a linear function of labor endowment, and a constant fraction of 
national income, Y.  Each country grows at rate g because they can 
benefit from world exogenous labor productivity which grows at g.  But 
nations will have different income levels when policy variables are 
different.   National income rises with productive government spending 
and declines with distortionary taxes. 
In the steady state each household will purchase sufficient new 
capital to cover depreciation, ρ, and to finance new investment to match 
productivity growth, g.  Any remaining disposable income and transfers 
will be used for consumption, cs, so: 
 
where θ is the proportion of a household=s production that is used to 
finance investment: θ=1-(g+ρ)α/r. 
 
2.3.  Optimal tax, spending and transfer policies 
δσ  + g = r •  
l )G   , Y( = l G) ++g ()1 A( = y sss τρδστα β
γ
β
α
β
α
β
α  
l] t + )G   , Y( )(1 [ = c sss ττθ  
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Politicians must maximize (1) subject to (2) and (6).  The solution 
characterizes the steady state path for government spending, 
distortionary taxes, and lump sum transfers.   
With Cobb-Douglas technologies the optimal level of government 
spending will be a constant fraction of income:   
 
This is what Barro (1990) calls the productive efficiency condition. 
The cross country pattern of taxes and transfers is determined by 
one parameter.  This parameter, L(s*), is the sum of the individual labor 
endowments of each member of the elite, and it measures the political 
elite=s share of the productive resources in the economy.9  When the 
political elite is highly representative, so that their share of resources in 
the economy is large, then politicians will have less incentive to 
introduce distortionary policies that reduce national income.  The elite 
gains when distortionary taxes are introduced because they receive the 
additional revenues as transfers, but these taxes are costly since the 
distortions also reduce household income.   
The optimal tax rate will be determined in two stages.  First the 
government must decide whether to enter into a transfer program.  When 
choosing to introduce higher taxes in order to finance transfers, 
politicians must compare the marginal benefit of one additional unit of 
transfers with the marginal cost of raising that transfer.  But since it is 
always optimal to have some taxation to finance government 
expenditures, the marginal cost of raising one unit of finance is always 
strictly greater than one unit.  This wedge between the costs and benefits 
means that after financing the optimal level of public goods, the 
government will only choose to enter into a transfer program if there is a 
sufficiently strong desire to redistribute, ie the parameter L(s*) must be 
smaller than some threshold level L.  There are therefore two regions for 
the optimal tax rate depending on whether the representativeness of the 
political elite is less than or greater than this threshold: 
γ = 
Y
G  
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where: 
Figure 2A graphs the optimal tax policy as a function of the 
representativeness of the political elite.  The labor share at the 
intersection of (8) and (9) shows the threshold level where the political 
regime chooses a tax policy identical to Barro=s benevolent dictator.  I 
define this as a Laissez-Faire regime since the government does not enter 
into a transfer program.  Below this threshold taxes and transfers rise.  
Egalitarian and elitist regimes are defined as outcomes where politicians 
choose to enter into a transfer program.  
Figure 2B shows that these regimes will use foreign aid differently. 
 A rise in foreign assistance permits the Laissez-Faire government to 
reduce distortions, and as shown in equation (8) a Laissez-Faire 
government would reduce taxes by the same amount as transfers.  This is 
shown on Figure 2B as a shift downward in the tax rate.  But this is not 
the case for egalitarian and elitist regimes.  These regimes have already 
chosen the tax rate to equate the benefits and costs of distortionary taxes, 
and as shown in equation (9) these benefits and costs are not affected by 
receiving additional lump sum financing from abroad.  Egalitarian and 
elitist governments use foreign assistance to increase transfers but they 
do not change distortionary policies. 
 
L < )sL( if  )sL(   1 
)sL(     1  = **
*
θ
θ
ατ  
L > )sL( if       Y
F   = *γτ  
) 
Y
F     2 ( 
Y
F      1
 = L
γαθ
γα
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2.4. National accounts and political regime shifts 
We can now derive equations for national accounts and 
distortionary policies as a function of foreign aid receipts.  The predicted 
impact of foreign aid under alternative political regimes can be used to 
derive empirical tests.  We can also examine how political regimes shifts 
change macroeconomic outcomes.     
To derive equations for the national accounts it is useful to express 
optimal tax policy as a general rule: 
where ω=0,1 for an elitist/egalitarian or laissez-faire regime respectively, 
and τs* is the initial level of taxes prior to aid receipts (which depends on 
the labor supply of the elite indexed here by s*). We can solve for the 
average propensity to consume, investment ratio and national income by 
aggregating consumption, investment and income over all households: 
 
Y
F   = s* •ωττ  
Y
F ))   1 (   (1 +  )(1 +  = 
Y
C
s
T
* θωτθθ  
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Figure 3 graphs the cross section of national incomes when we 
allow the representativeness of government to vary.  The vertical axis 
shows income per capita relative to income in a country with a laissez-
faire government.  When there is no foreign aid, national income 
depends on tax rates, and tax rates rise as the government becomes less 
representative.  When distortions rise the incentive to invest falls, and in 
general equilibrium savings rates also fall.  Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992) argue that the positive correlation between savings and income in 
cross country data is evidence in favor of the Solow model, but here this 
correlation is driven by greater investment opportunities in those 
countries with less distortionary policies.  Cross country patterns are 
driven by underlying differences in political regimes. 
The poor countries in this model are nations that have governments 
which have chosen to enter into transfer programs.  Since these 
politicians will use aid flows to increase transfers rather than reduce 
distortions, foreign assistance does not raise income or investment B it is 
used instead to raise consumption.  But even when aid is consumed it 
may not be wasted.  There are two types of poor nations at any point 
such as B on the graph.  An  egalitarian government at point B transfers 
foreign aid to the poor, so aid may still be successful at reducing 
poverty.  An elitist government transfers funds to a political elite. Only 
elitist governments waste aid as described by Bauer (1971) and 
Friedman (1958). 
This framework also shows one way political regime shifts can 
affect macroeconomic variables.  If the government becomes more 
representative, so that it shifts from point A to point B on Figure 3, then 
both the savings rate and income of that country would rise.  The more 
representative government would reduce economic distortions and 
improve policies so that the country would grow faster and catch-up to 
Y
F  )   1 ( + )  1 ( )   1 ( = 
Y
I
s* ωθτθ  
) 
Y
F  +   1 (   A  = Y *ss* β
α
β
γ
β
α
β
α
ωτγτα  
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wealthier nations.  Alteratively, even if governments remain at point B 
but a revolution installs a more egalitarian government, then poverty 
indicators will improve and income distribution will become less skewed 
since the new governments will direct transfers to the poor. 
This interpretation of political regime reflects one line of  the 
debate over foreign assistance.  In this model long term assistance will 
not succeed unless it is conditional on policy changes, and if the 
conditionality succeeds we can expect aid to correlate with growth as the 
country catches up to its high income neighbors.  Short term aid 
programs that support better political regimes can also be expected to 
improve poverty indicators so long as they help lay the political 
foundations for economic reforms that support the poor.  But if aid 
programs are unrelated to political reforms, or they are ineffective at 
imposing conditionality, then this model predicts aid will not lead to 
growth or catch-up and aid would not benefit the poor.  These 
observations motivate my empirical tests in the next section. 
So far I have not explicitly modeled the reasons countries give aid, 
but it is easy to see how permanent transfers could be realistically 
justified.  If altruism motivates aid then rich countries will permanently 
give to poor countries.  As long as relative incomes are constant in the 
steady-state, suitable conditions on altruism will ensure that aid is 
permanent.  Alternatively, if aid is better represented by a market where 
countries buy and sell influence, say for example votes at the United 
Nations, then as long as rich countries consume more votes than poor 
countries, transfers will go from rich to poor.  With suitable restrictions 
on preferences, in the steady state aid/the price of votes will grow at the 
same rate as income.  
 
3.  Empirical Tests 
My empirical tests will be based on the null hypothesis, in line with 
the arguments of Bauer (1971) and Friedman (1958), that politicians will 
use aid for transfers and not for growth producing reductions in internal 
distortions.  Under the null hypothesis both domestic income and growth 
rates are independent of foreign aid. 
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The first test is to ask whether aid receipts have permitted 
governments to reduce or eliminate distortionary policies.  This test can 
be based on a general solution for the tax rate: 
 
where βτ  is a regression coefficient, µj is a country specific random term, 
and εjt is a white noise error term.  Once I properly instrument for aid, I 
can test the null hypothesis   H0:  βτ=0.  My interpretation of distortions 
is not taxes per se, but the whole framework of distortions introduced by 
many governments.  Since these are generally not measurable, this test 
can be based only on direct tax measures or indexes of distortionary 
policies.    
The second test examines the indirect impact of reduced distortions 
by testing for changes in consumption and investment, and it can also be 
interpreted as a test of the importance of capital shortage in restricting 
investment.  I estimate (12) and (13) using long averages of national 
accounts data, allowing for a country specific random error and time 
dummies.  The regression equations are as follows: 
 
with the null hypothesis that H 0 : βC = 1 and H 0 : β I  = 0.  Note that these 
equations are not independent, so the sum of the coefficients on aid in 
the investment and consumption equations should equal one.  My 
regression results will be biased if aid flows are correlated with other 
εµβττ τ jtjj  +  + Y
F  +  =       
εµβ jtj
j
jC
j
T
 +  + 
Y
F  + 
Y
C = 
Y
C j  
εµβ jtj
j
jI
j
j     
Y
F  + 
Y
I = 
Y
I  
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capital inflows, or there is measurement error in the aid data.  I can test 
for this by examining if  the sum of these two coefficients is significantly 
different from one.10 
The third set of empirical tests examines who benefits from aid.  
This allows me to differentiate between egalitarian and elitist regimes. 
The best widely available indicators of poverty are infant mortality, life 
expectancy and primary schooling ratios.  Here I examine whether 
governments used aid receipts to benefit the poor.  I do this by running 
regressions of the log difference of these indicators on initial conditions, 
and the aid GNP ratio properly instrumented: 
An elitist regime allocates all aid to a wealthy elite, so human 
development indicators will not change: βX= 0.   I chose log differences 
here rather than levels because investments in health care and education 
take time, and I allowed for non-linear response to initial conditions 
since the potential improvements in indicators will depend on starting 
values.  If the poor benefit directly from aid, they can invest in better 
housing, education, sanitation and nutrition.   Infant mortality will 
improve quickly if the government invests in public health services 
targeted to the poor.11   Finally, the fourth set of tests examines 
whether certain political regimes use aid more effectively than others.  I 
do this by interacting foreign aid with indexes of political liberties in 
each of the above regressions.  If democracies or liberal political regimes 
use aid more effectively to benefit the poor then the interaction term 
between aid and political liberties should show these benefits.  
 
4.  Data Sources and Definitions 
To implement these tests I use data on net Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) published by the OECD.  ODA is defined as all 
transfers from official sources with at least a 25% grant component but 
in practice is virtually all grants (the grant component averaged 93% 
εµβββ jtjXt11t10t  +  + Y
F  + )X(  + X  + X = )X(  loglog∆  
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during the sample period).  They only include aid aimed at improving 
human or economic welfare so military assistance is excluded.  Table 1 
describes the allocation of aid according to use and donor.  
Approximately 30% of aid is cash transfers, and another 10% are untied 
balance of payments support (not shown).  Emergency aid is only a 
small fraction of total flows, and bilateral aid makes up approximately 
three quarters of all ODA.  In summary, aid is a large and highly 
fungible source of assistance to recipient countries.12 
The national accounts data and human welfare indicators are  from 
the World Bank and Summers and Heston data base.  I use the World 
Bank measure of dollar GNP since this is primarily based on market 
exchange rates, and I need to measure the value of aid at market prices.  
The World Bank GNP excludes official transfers which is the same 
concept I  used in the analytical part of this paper.  
Throughout this paper I present results using a base sample of 
countries in decade averaged data common to the World Bank, Summers 
and Heston and the OECD data base.  I use five year and decade 
averaged data in order to eliminate business cycle factors and 
measurement error.  Any benefit from using annual data is diminished 
because the best instruments for permanent aid flows change slowly over 
time.  I then exclude OPEC countries since they both give and receive 
aid during this sample period.  I also exclude Israel since it is arguably a 
special case.  On examining the data there were four observations with 
measurement error described in an endnote.13 Any other exclusions are 
due to missing observations.      
The BASE SAMPLE is composed of the remaining 96 countries 
including all observations where the recipient's aid was less than 15% of 
GNP.   In the derivations of Section 2, I assumed that aid was fungible  B 
if aid is not fungible than aid will certainly raise investment since some 
40% of aid is directed to investment projects.  As discussed in the 
empirical section, I exclude the 14 observations with AID/GNP ratios 
greater than 15% because it appears that beyond these levels aid is no 
longer fungible.  I compare results using this base sample to the FULL 
SAMPLE where all observations are included. 
  
5.  The Motives for Giving Aid 
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Despite the popular belief that aid is primarily motivated to assist 
the poor, substantial evidence points to political, strategic, and welfare 
interests of donor countries as the driving force behind aid programs.   
Studies by Maizels and Nissanke (MN, 1984), McKinlay and Little 
(ML, 1977, 1978a, 1978b, 1979), Mosley (1985,1987), Frey and 
Schneider (1986) and Trumbull and Wall (1994) analyze the 
determinants of foreign aid using cross-country regressions.  The series 
of studies by ML and MN focus on bilateral aid patterns and they 
attempt to measure whether "recipient needs" or "donor's interest" are 
they key factors motivating international aid flows.  They do this by 
including variables which measure donor interest, such as proxies for 
military importance of the country, whether it was a former colony, and 
measures of recipient needs such as quality of life indicators and income 
per capita. The studies broadly conclude that aid flows primarily reflect 
donor's interests rather than recipient needs.14 
Both ML and MN also examine each donor's motives for giving 
aid.  ML concludes that the greatest part of the variance in US aid flows 
can be explained by military and strategic factors.  They find that British 
and French aid goes to countries that were former colonies, and countries 
where these donors have historically strong trade relations and 
investment interests.  OPEC aid is given to neighboring countries and 
favors members of the Arab League.  
Table 2 shows my own regressions measuring cross-country 
determinants of aid. The table shows results using alternative 
subsamples, right-hand side variables, and regression techniques.  
Regression I shows that 65% of the variance in decade averaged aid 
flows is explained by income per capita and population alone.  A 10% 
increase in population reduces the aid/GNP ratio by 0.0032, while a 10% 
rise in per capita income reduces the same ratio by 0.0036.15     
In regression II, I allow for regional effects, external shocks 
measured by the cumulative sum of terms of trade shocks over the 
decade, and a Paris Club dummy set to one in 1981-90 if the country 
entered into debt rescheduling negotiations.  None of these variables is 
significant.  I also include per capita growth which has a small positive 
coefficient and is insignificant.   
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The variables titled "Friends of US" and "Friends of OPEC" are 
political dummies aimed at capturing the importance of the country to a 
particular donor.  These dummies are set to one if the country receives 
more than 1% of the total aid budget of the donor.  The US Congress 
must vet every aid allocation, and therefore large nominal amounts must 
be determined by political rather than need-based factors.  Large OPEC 
aid disbursements are primarily to neighboring Arab countries.  "Friends 
of France" is set to one for members of the Franc zone reflecting 
France's special relations with her former African colonies.  These 
variables are generally significant after controlling for regional 
dummies, and other factors that would influence aid flows.     
In regression III, I include the aid/GNP ratio lagged twice and 
income per capita as regressors.  The twice lagged aid/GNP ratio should 
be uncorrelated with business cycle disturbances but correlated with the 
political determinants of aid that are relatively permanent. 
In regression IV, I include two variables that capture human 
development indicators as proxied by start of period infant mortality and 
life expectancy.  Neither coefficient is significant, showing that once I 
control for income per capita, aid flows are not directed to countries with 
poor human development conditions.   
Regression V estimates the equation allowing for country specific 
fixed effects.   In this case the population term becomes insignificant 
though the sign remains negative.  This probably reflects the small 
variance of population growth in the data, and the fact that population is 
more a proxy for size of the economy rather than the actual number of 
bodies.  
There are several reasons why size of country may be an important 
determinant of aid flows.  First, both international institutions and 
bilateral donors are hesitant to transfer large nominal amounts to any one 
country for political reasons.  Large nominal transfers will come under 
much greater public scrutiny than relatively smaller amounts.  Second, 
there are minimal amounts that can be transferred due to fixed costs of 
entry.  Mosley et al (1991) reports that the World Bank's loan procedures 
effectively favor small countries for this reason.  Third, it maybe that 
small countries have relatively more influence for sale, taking into 
account size, than larger countries.  The most trivial example of this 
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would be the sale of votes at the United Nations.  If an international 
market develops for these votes, then small, poor countries would sell 
votes to large rich countries.  This would lead to a negative correlation 
between aid and both income per capita and population in cross country 
regressions.  Finally, small countries may be more willing to sell their 
influence.  Small countries may gain more from joining a coalition than 
by acting independently. 
Table 3 shows that aid flows have a large permanent component. 
Here I report results from estimating time trends for the aid/GNP ratio of 
each country separately.  Using these time trends, I project that only 20% 
of recipient countries will receive zero aid within 50 years but slightly 
less than one half of the countries have significant time trends between 
1981 and 1990.    
For the remainder of this paper I will focus on three key findings.  
First, political factors largely determine aid flows.  I will use the political 
proxies and size of country to form alternative instrument for aid flows.  
Second, the motivations for giving aid vary by donor.  This will allow 
me to conduct instrument robustness tests by examining the impact of 
aid when alternative donors (with varying motives for giving aid) are 
excluded from the sample.  Finally, aid flows have a large permanent 
component, so I will treat them as permanent transfers.  I test for 
measurement error resulting from this assumption by excluding those 
countries where aid is predicted to decline to zero in the next twenty 
years. 
 
6.  Instruments and Econometric Implementation 
In my empirical work I use three different instruments and then 
conduct a series of robustness and sensitivity tests.  Each instrument has 
strengths and weaknesses, so I compare results using alternative 
instruments and also conduct robustness tests as described below.     
The first instrument is the logarithm of population.  As described 
above small economies receive more aid than larger economies for 
political and structural reasons.  Certain endogenous growth models 
predict that large countries grow faster than small countries due to 
economies of scale.  But empirically this does not seem to be a relevant 
issue.  With reasonably free trade, low transport costs, capital mobility, 
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and inexpensive communications it is hard to see how largeness provides 
any clear benefits.  The actual economic success of many small countries 
reinforces this point.     
The second instrument directly captures the political determinants 
of aid flows.  I use three variables to capture interests of major donors 
with clear political agendas.  These are the variables described above:  
Friends of US, Friends of OPEC, and Friends of France.  In these 
regressions I also control for other determinants of aid flows, so the 
instruments capture  large aid flows from donors after controlling for 
income, growth rates, etc.  These instruments are valid if the recipient 
countries receive these large aid flows purely for political reasons.  The 
instruments would be invalid if large bilateral aid was driven by factors 
related to country need that I have not controlled for.  My assumption 
here is that the US, French and OPEC countries give this aid for political 
motives.     
The final instrument is twice-lagged aid (here I use five year 
averages of data).  Lagged aid should be uncorrelated with emergencies 
and business cycle factors while correlated with the long term political 
and strategic factors that make some countries high aid recipients.  This 
makes it a good candidate as an instrument, but several caveats should 
be taken into account. Business cycle factors could introduce a spurious 
correlation between aid and national accounts over the business cycle.  
This is particularly true of shocks that cause temporary fluctuations in 
the real exchange rate such as fiscal spending financed by foreign 
borrowing.16  To limit this sort of spurious correlation I use two lags of 
aid.  A second caveat is that high aid/GNP ratios may reflect more 
fundamental problems that cause poverty in recipient countries.  To the 
extent that these problems persist over long periods of time, then lagged 
aid will be correlated with these fundamental factors.  In this case 
population and the political instruments described above will serve as 
alternative means to test robustness of the results. 
I compare the results from these IV regressions with OLS 
regressions where I control for income levels, terms of trade shocks, and 
other important country characteristics.  These OLS regressions also 
allow me to test whether aid from different donors has different impacts 
and therefore biases my results.  For example, Papanek (1972) argues 
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that US assistance is directed to strategically important countries and 
these countries may have other characteristics, such as high tax rates to 
finance military expenditures, that will affect investment and savings.  It 
is also possible that US aid is allocated differently from other aid, so that 
it has a different impact on national accounts and poverty indicators.  I 
can test the robustness of my results to these potential biases by running 
regressions where I include both US aid and all aid as right hand side 
variables: 
and then testing the null hypothesis:  βUS = 0.  The Z variables are a set 
of control variables that I include in each regression.  The null 
hypothesis is a joint test that United States aid has the same impact as 
other country=s aid, and that American aid is uncorrelated with specific 
characteristics of the country.   
   
7.  The Aggregate Impact of Aid Flows 
I begin this section by summarizing my main findings and I discuss 
robustness and sensitivity tests.  The second subsection analyzes the 
impact of aid on human development indicators. 
 
7a.  Main finding and robustness tests   
Table 4 summarizes 76 regressions using alternative instruments, Z 
variables, and samples and regression techniques. Each cell shows the 
coefficient on the AID/GNP.  In every case the sum of the estimated 
coefficients in the consumption and investment equations is 
insignificantly different from one, so I can conclude that aid receipts are 
not correlated with other capital inflows. 
The estimates in column one capture my general findings.  The 
control variables in this regression are income per capita, per capita 
growth, and regional dummies and measures of external shocks.  The 
full regression results are shown for reference in Table 5.17 
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The estimated parameters are consistent with an elitist political 
regime.  The marginal propensity to consume from aid (public and 
private) is insignificantly different from one, and the marginal propensity 
to invest is insignificantly different from zero.  The point estimates show 
that approximately three quarters of aid is used to raise public 
consumption, and one quarter goes to private consumption.  It is 
interesting to note that these results are similar to the findings in the 
early literature on aid and savings such as Griffin (1970) and a more 
recent paper by Levy (1987).  These authors did not attempt to 
instrument their data, and as can be seen from this table, the expected 
simultaneity bias disappears once we control for income levels in OLS 
regressions.     
Given that government spending rises by three quarters of aid 
flows, it is not surprising that there is no impact of aid on taxes.  Only 
two tax measures are available for the countries in my data set.  These 
are the inflation tax (the average percentage change in the GDP deflator 
divided by 100) and indirect taxes net of subsidies expressed as a 
fraction of GNP.  Each coefficient is insignificant and the signs vary 
across regressions.  In order to capture whether aid correlated with 
improvements in basic policy indicators, I also ran regressions using the 
black market exchange rate premium as an index of policy distortions.  
In every case the impact of aid is insignificant and generally has the 
wrong sign.   
While consumption does rise, there is no evidence that the poor 
benefit from aid.  The coefficient on aid in the infant mortality equation 
has the right sign but is small.  It predicts that annual aid flows of 10% 
of GNP will reduce infant mortality by 2% over the decade.  The 
coefficient on primary schooling has the wrong sign, and there is no 
clear impact on life expectancy.   
In summary, the results imply that most or all aid goes to 
consumption, it increases the size of government,  and does not benefit 
the poor.  The remaining columns use alternative data samples and 
instruments to test the robustness of these results.  
The second column shows that when I only control for income per 
capita the results do not change. The third and fourth columns show 
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results when I instrument aid using the instruments described in the 
previous section.   
Column three reports results when I instrument aid directly using 
the log of population as an instrument.  Here the basic results do not 
change but the coefficient on the inflation tax is larger though it is still 
insignificant.  It implies that countries that receive aid equal to 10% of 
GNP have on average 69% lower inflation.  This almost certainly 
captures the impact of Latin American countries that are relatively large, 
and receive little aid.  Column four shows similar findings when I 
instrument aid including proxies for political interest of donor countries.  
The fifth column shows aid does have an impact on investment 
when I use the FULL SAMPLE.  This is the only regression where the 
coefficient on investment is significant.  This sample adds 14 
observations for small countries where the aid/GNP ratio ranges from 
0.15- 0.54.  These are small countries where one large investment 
projection can equal 50% of GNP.18  These large investment projects 
would not be fungible, so  the high coefficient on investment will reflect 
the impact of directed aid programs.  It may also be easier for donors to 
monitor projects in very small countries, or the projects they choose 
maybe less fungible given the size of the economy.  When small 
amounts of aid are used, as in the base sample, it is easier for recipient 
governments to effectively redirect aid.  Column VI restricts the sample 
to those countries with aid/GNP ratios less than 0.1.  Here I find similar 
results as in the base sample.19,20   
The last two columns test for robustness using five year data 
averages and alternative regression techniques.  In theory I prefer longer 
time averages in order to smooth out temporary shocks.  As I reduce the 
sample averages, I increase the transitory component of the variance in 
aid flows.  This will lower the estimated propensity to consume from aid 
since optimizing consumers will consume only a fraction of temporary 
income.  Likewise optimizing governments should smooth distortionary 
taxation.  The basic conclusions do not change in five year data, 
providing some evidence that the permanence of transfers is not an 
important source of measurement error.  To further test for permanence, 
I also ran regressions excluding the 21 countries which I project in Table 
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3 will receive no aid by 2010.  None of the empirical results changed 
using this subsample.21 
 Column VII shows results when I use twice-lagged aid as an 
instrument.  In this smaller sample the coefficient on total consumption 
rises, but the implied share of aid going to investment remains small.  
The last column shows the findings are robust when I allow for country 
specific fixed effects.  These results are sensitive to the control variables 
that are included and the coefficient on investment is much higher if only 
income per capita is kept as a control variable.  One problem with this 
estimator is that by extracting the fixed effect I leave only the time series 
variation in aid, this may increase the relative variance of transitory aid 
components in the data. 
Lastly, Table 6 reports test statistics from my robustness tests.  My 
procedure is described in (19).  The table shows the t-statistics on each 
donor's aid in regressions using the full set of control variables shown in 
Table 5.  Out of 54 cases, 3 are significant at the 1% level, 1 is 
significant at the 5% level, and 4 are significant at the 10% level.  While 
the number of significant terms is more than should be expected, it turns 
out that four of these cases are on coefficients showing the division 
between public and private consumption.  As described in an endnote, 
some countries allocate more aid to private consumption than others.22  
Table 6 suggests this may reflect how each donor allocates aid since the 
division between private and government consumption appears to vary 
by donor.  This may reflect differences in how each donor allocates aid.  
But Table 6 also shows that the coefficients on the main variables: total 
consumption, investment and infant mortality are robust.  The remaining 
significant coefficients show no consistent pattern across indicators, so I 
suspect they represent spurious correlation. 
 
7b.  Government failure 
The lack of impact of aid on human development indicators, and 
particularly infant mortality,  is strong evidence of government failure.  
Aid could influence infant mortality either directly through higher 
consumption of the poor, or indirectly through greater provision of 
public services to the poor. 
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 Survey data shows that in less developed countries the poorest 
60% of the population earn 26% of national income.23  If a country 
received aid equal to 10% of GNP, and if all aid were allocated to the 
bottom three quintiles of income earners, the income of this group could 
potentially rise by 38%.  Based on the cross country relation between 
infant mortality and income, this could reduce infant mortality by 
roughly 20%.24  Instead my estimates predict infant mortality falls by 2-
3%, and there is no evidence in cross section data (see table 2) that high 
aid recipients have better initial levels of infant mortality.  This shows 
that the poor receive very little of the benefits of aid programs. 
Figure 4 shows that governments can improve these indicators 
when they are determined to do so.  Figure 4 is a component plus 
residual plot.  The vertical axis shows the sum of regression residuals 
and the component of the change in infant mortality that can be 
explained by foreign aid.  These are plotted against the aid/GNP ratio of 
the recipient.  Here I use the regression in Table 5 but with data averaged 
over twenty years.  Chile and Costa Rica are two outliers in the left 
corner of this plot.  These two countries  are famous for their directed 
health programs aimed at improving infant mortality and general health 
indexes.25  The World Bank (1993) estimates similar programs would 
cost 3.1% of GNP in low income countries.  The lack of correlation 
between aid and health indicators shows that foreign aid does not 
introduce incentives into recipient countries to improve human 
development indicators.  It also shows that financing is not the main 
constraint barring countries from improving human development 
indicators.      
 
8.  Do Alternative Political Regimes Use Aid Differently? 
My regressions may be biased because I have pooled together 
nations with very different political regimes.  Indeed, some aid advocates 
argue that aid should only go to countries with "good" political regimes 
since these are the countries that will use aid effectively.     
In this section I test whether alternative political regimes use aid 
differently, and I also test whether different political regimes are more 
successful at relieving poverty.  I use two different categorizations of 
regime types.  First, I use an index of political liberties published by 
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Gastil (1989).  This is an ordinal ranking of political liberties based on 
country surveys.  I invert their scale so the index ranges from 0.142 to 
1.00 in ascending order of political liberties using the measure for the 
middle of each decade.  The second index is a dummy set to one if the 
country is a liberal democracy according to Derbyshire and Derbyshire 
(1989) throughout the whole sample period, and zero otherwise.   
My first set of tests examines whether different political regimes 
use aid differently.  I run each regression from the first column of the 
summary table 4, now including an interaction term with foreign aid, and 
an own effect as a proxy for the possible impact of political regimes.  
The coefficients on these variables are reported in Table 7. 
The results show that liberal political regimes do not use aid any 
differently from the most repressive regimes.  No interaction term or 
own effect term is significant at the 5% level, and coefficients are 
generally small.26  
These findings suggest that all political regimes allocate foreign aid 
to a high income political elite.  But it is interesting to examine whether 
different political regimes perform better in measures of basic human 
development indicators.  In my framework political regime shifts or 
revolutions can lead to improvements in poverty indicators if the new 
governments are more egalitarian and more representative.  Even though 
liberal democracies may still use aid in a similar manner as other 
regimes, they may still give more power to the poor.  This power could 
induce governments to provide more basic services. 
Table 8 shows that in this cross section of non-communist 
countries, liberal political regimes have roughly 30% lower infant 
mortality, ceteris paribus, than the most restrictive regimes.  The first 
column includes a dummy variable indicating political regime according 
to Derbyshire and Derbyshire's (1989) categorization.  There are four 
political categories, and the point estimate in the first column shows that 
liberal democracies, ceteris paribus, have 32.8% lower infant mortality 
than emerging democratic regimes (the excluded category) and 12% to 
18% less than socialist and authoritarian regimes respectively.  These 
results do not hold up within continents, for example in a regression with 
only African nations the coefficient on Gastil=s index becomes slightly 
positive and insignificant.  This may be due to the small sample, the 
  27 
remaining four columns show these results remain robust when I exclude 
particular continents. 
I interpret the relatively low rates of infant mortality in liberal 
regimes as evidence of greater empowerment of the poor in these 
countries.  Poor households probably have significantly more influence 
in a democratic country with a free press and free speech.  This induces 
the government to make more efforts to provide basic services to these 
groups, and even small expenditures and efforts can have dramatic 
effects upon basic measures of poverty and health as described above.  
But even in a democratic regime the poor are bound to be weak in the 
political process.  It may be difficult to coordinate and mobilize the vote 
in the interests of the poor, and illiteracy and poor health must be 
important hindrances to political activity.  The finding that democracies 
and liberal regimes do not allocate aid any differently from other 
regimes suggests that while the poor have enough additional power to 
gain better basic services in liberal societies, they continue to be weak 
relative to the political elite and hence only receive a small fraction of 
the benefits of aid.27 
 
9.  Conclusions  
The aim of this paper was to relate the effectiveness of foreign aid 
programs to the political regime of recipient countries.  I presented a 
simple analytical framework where poverty is caused or enhanced by 
distortionary policies introduced by politicians.  In my framework, aid 
does not promote economic development for two reasons:  Poverty is not 
caused by capital shortage, and it is not optimal for politicians to adjust 
distortionary policies when they receive aid flows.  
Between 1971 and 1990 most long term aid was provided on a 
regular basis with little or no effective conditionality.  I found this aid 
increased consumption but higher consumption did not benefit the poor.  
The point estimates in my regressions show there was an insignificant 
impact on investment in countries that received less than 15% of GNP in 
aid, though standard errors on these estimates were large.  I also found 
that aid had an insignificant impact on improvements in basic measures 
of human development such as infant mortality and primary schooling 
ratios.  These results suggest that even while particular programs such as 
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immunization and resarch can be effective, the bulk of long term aid 
programs have had little impact on human development and investment 
between 1971 and 1990.     
My empirical results are consistent with a model where politicians 
maximize welfare of a wealthy elite, and consistent with the pessimistic 
predictions of Bauer (1971) and Friedman (1958).  Past experience has 
proven it is possible to dramatically improve human development 
indiciators at low cost over a ten to twenty year period.  Dreze and Sen 
(1989) argue that the failure of governments to reduce infant mortality 
and improve basic human development indicators reflects public choice. 
 The findings in this paper suggest that aid programs have not 
substantially changed government's incentives to carry out these 
programs, nor have aid programs engendered or correlated with the basic 
ingredients that cause investment and growth. 
 These findings emphasize the need to better understand the 
potential role of aid as a tool in changing political incentives.  Casella 
and Eichengreen (1995) examine the potential efficacy of aid in ending 
harmful wars of attrition between political actors, and Sachs (1994) 
concludes that short term aid has in the past played a key role in 
promoting stabilization and maintaining political stability.  In my model 
aid can be effective when it is conditional on policy and/or political 
reforms, and it can be effective in narrow cases where aid is non-
fungible. 
I presented some evidence that political reforms alone can play an 
important role.  In my empirical work I concluded that while at the 
margin all political systems allocate aid to the elite, liberal political 
regimes, ceteris paribus, have approximately 30% lower infant mortality 
than the least free regimes.  This may reflect a willingness of liberal 
regimes to provide more of the basic, though inexpensive services that 
are needed to prevent famine and improve human development 
indicators.  But it may also reflect other cultural factors or economic 
conditions that I was unable to control for in these regressions.  My 
coefficient estimates imply that in order to achieve the same reduction in 
infant mortality through existing long term aid programs, donors would 
have to provide annual aid equal to 150% of GNP for ten years to the 
recipient country.  
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One plausible implication is that short term aid programs targeted 
to support new liberal political regimes, and to encourage greater 
political and social liberties, may be a more effective means of 
promoting growth and reducing poverty than current aid programs.  If 
these new regimes stay in power long enough to improve literacy, health 
care, and education then they may sufficiently empower the poor in the 
political system so that poverty reduction becomes self-sustaining.  But 
alternatively, it may be that the underlying factors that support liberal 
regimes and poverty reduction are rooted in historical, cultural and 
institutional factors that are not affected by new governments.  In this 
case, new liberal regimes will not survive, or they may not implement 
the basic policies needed to reduce poverty and promote growth.  
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 APPENDIX 1 
 
Definitions and Source of Regression Variables 
  
AID/GNP: 
 
Ratio of dollar aid from OECD to dollar GNP as measured by theWorld 
Bank 
 
LGNPCAP: 
 
Log of per capita GNP measured relative to the high income OECD from 
the World  Bank 
 
Per Capita GNP 
Growth: 
 
Average real GNP growth rate over the sample period fromWorld Bank 
 
Population Growth: 
 
Average population growth rate fromWorld Bank  
 
Terms of Trade: 
 
Cumulative income gains/losses due to terms of trade changes measured as 
a fraction of GNP as calculated by the World Bank 
 
Debt Rescheduling: 
 
Dummy variable set to one if the country entered into rescheduling 
agreements with the Paris Club between 1981 and 1990 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa: 
 
Dummy set to one if the country is in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Asia: 
 
Dummy set to one if the country is in Asia 
 
Latin America: 
 
Dummy set to one if the country is in Latin America 
 
Infant Mortality: 
 
Infant mortality per thousand births from World Bank 
 
Life Expectancy: 
 
Life expectancy at birth from World Bank 
 
Primary Schooling: 
 
Percent of eligible age children in primary schooling 
 
Total Consumption: 
 
Ratio of public and private consumption to GNP from World Bank 
 
Private 
Consumption: 
 
 
Ratio of private consumption to GNP from World Bank 
 
Investment: 
 
Ratio of public and private gross investment to GNP from World Bank 
 
Public Consumption: 
 
Ratio of public consumption to GNP 
 
Indirect Taxes: 
 
Ratio of indirect taxes net of subsidies to GNP from World Bank 
 
Inflation Tax: 
 
Average percent increase in GNP deflator divided by 100 
 
Political Rights 
Indicator: 
 
Ascending ranking of political liberties ranging from 0.14 to 1 formed by 
inverting Gastil's (1989) rankings of countries for 1976 and 1986 
 
Democratic Regime: 
 
Dummy variable set to one if the regime is a liberal democracy according to 
Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1989). 
 
Socialist: 
 
as above for socialist regimes and China. 
 
Military, 
Authoritarian and 
other: 
 
 
as above, all regimes other than emerging democracy. 
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 APPENDIX 2 
 
A.  Solution to the Politician's Optimization Problem 
This appendix derives the solution to the politician's maximization 
problem.  I consider a world with numerous countries all growing at a 
constant rate, g, along a steady-state balanced growth path.  Each 
country has a different political system, but all other parameters are 
identical.  I drop all time subscripts for convenience.   
The politician's role is to finance public spending and transfers 
using revenues from a distortionary income tax and foreign aid.  He 
solves: 
subject to: 
cs: consumption of individual s 
F: foreign aid to the government 
G: expenditures on public goods and services 
Y: national income 
ls: labor endowment of person s 
ts: transfer per effective labor unit to person s 
u(c): utility of person consuming c, u8 is concave and twice 
differentiable. 
ψ(s): political weighting of person s, ψ(s) is continuous and twice 
differentiable. 
τ: income tax rate 
 
Each citizen is endowed with labor supply, ls, and the sum across the 
population is one.  Each member of the ruling coalition is identical with 
labor, ls*, and a common value of ψ(s*). 
A.1.  Production 
s ) cu( (s)     s
1
s1G,,t *s ∂∫ ψτmax  
s lt =G   F + Y ss
1
0 ∂∫τ  
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    A typical household s produces goods using a Cobb-Douglas 
bundle of human and physical capital, labor and government services: 
 
where each household must self finance their own investments.   A 
reflects exogenous labor augmenting productivity growth and grows at 
rate g.  
 
A.2.  Consumers 
Consumer's maximize time additive separable utility with discount rate 
δ, intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ: 
 
ve1
c  (vt)
1
v
tcsv ∂∫∞ δ
σ
σ
max  
subject to: 
 c  lt + y )(1 = k svsvsvss τ  
 
and transversality conditions: 
The consumer=s euler 
equation is: 
)(r 1 = 
c
c
v
v δ
σ
  
In the steady state consumption must grow at rate g, so the interest rate 
will be determined by solving (7) for r. 
Using (7) and combining the first order condition for the choice of 
capital stock, production of a household s can be written as a function of 
tax rates and government spending: 
where ρ is the rate of depreciation on capital, and Y is national income.  
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In the steady state each household will purchase sufficient new 
capital, is,  to cover depreciation and maintain a constant capital/effective 
labor ratio.  Total disposable income will equal income ys, less taxes plus 
transfers tsls.  Consumption then equals disposable income less savings: 
 
where I have solved for a reduced form consumption equation (11) by 
substituting for the optimal capital/output ratio from the Cobb-Douglas 
production function (rks=(1-τ)ys) and substituting from (9) for own 
income with θ=1-(g+ρ)α/r.   
The planners problem is to maximize (1) subject to (2) and (11).  
The first order conditions from this are: 
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where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the government budget constraint. 
Equations (12) and (13) determine optimal government spending as 
a function of the tax rate: 
The optimal tax rate is found by solving (12) and (15) when transfers are 
operative, or (12) and (14) when they are not operative: 
 
 
where: 
and the remaining equations are determined as described in the text.  
National consumption and investment can then be calculated by 
integrating each household's consumption and investment function, (A9) 
and (A11), and substituting for the government's budget constraint 
(A14). 
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 TABLE 1  
 
 Basic Facts about Aid 
 (in the sample of 97 countries)  
 
 
Average Aid/GNP ratio 
81-90:  range 0.00-0.54, sdev 0.112  
71-80:  range 0.00-0.35, sdev 0.035 
 
in Base Sample: 
81-90:  range 0.00-0.144, sdev 0.039  
71-80:  range 0.00-0.146, sdev 0.045 
 
 
0.086 
0.056 
 
 
0.042 
0.046 
 
 
 Grant component (1980) 
 
0.93 
 
 Restrictions on Procurement (fraction by category): 
     Untied: 
     Partially tied: 
     Tied: 
 
 
 
0.71 
0.05 
0.25 
 
 Uses of Aid (fraction by type): 
    Emergency Aid 
    Food aid 
    Social and Admin. Infrastructure 
    Program aid 
    Economic Infrastructure 
    Other 
 
 
0.05 
0.13 
0.20 
0.06 
0.32 
0.24 
 
Sources of Aid 
    Multilateral 
    Bilateral (of which): 
          France 
          Japan 
          OPEC 
          United Kingdom 
          United States 
          Other 
 
 
0.25 
0.75 
0.13 
0.15 
0.07 
0.04 
0.18 
0.43 
 
Aid as a fraction of GDP from Donor Countries 
(members of DAC) 
    1970 
    1980 
    1990 
 
 
 
0.34 
0.35 
0.34 
 
Source: OECD (1992). 
Note:  Social and administrative infrastructure applies to health care, education, technical assistance to 
governments, etc.  Economic Infrastructure is highways, electricity, irrigation, and other large public 
investment projects.  Program aid is balance of payments support.   
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 TABLE 2 
Regressions Showing the Determinants of Aid, Dependent variable:  AID/GNP 
(panel data using base sample with four samples of 5 year averages 1971-5, 76-80, 81-85, 86-90) 
 
Variable: 
 
I 
 
II 
 
III 
 
IV 
 
V 
 
 
 
OLS 
 
OLS 
 
OLS 
 
OLS 
 
FE 
 
log of relative GNP/capita  
at start of period 
 
-0.036 
(13.5) 
 
-0.033 
(10.3) 
 
-0.022 
(11.3) 
 
-0.034 
(8.19) 
 
-0.035 
(4.97) 
 
log (Population) 
 
-0.032 
(9.37) 
 
-0.031 
(8.33) 
 
 
 
-0.032 
(8.82) 
 
-0.076 
(0.91) 
 
Friends of US 
 
 
 
 
0.011 
(2.68) 
 
 
 
0.008 
(1.68) 
 
0.017 
(4.35) 
 
Friend of OPEC 
 
 
 
 
0.020 
(3.56) 
 
 
 
0.023 
(3.82) 
 
0.010 
(1.67) 
 
Friend of France 
 
 
 
 
0.015 
(2.09) 
 
 
 
0.016 
(1.96) 
 
NA 
 
Twice-Lagged Aid/GNP 
 
 
 
 
 
0.486 
(12.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Per capita GNP growth rate  
 
 
 
0.053 
(1.17) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.047 
(1.01) 
 
Terms of Trade 
 
 
 
0.002 
(0.05) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.028 
(0.54) 
 
Debt Rescheduling 
 
 
 
-0.004 
(0.90) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
 
0.006 
(0.73) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asia 
 
 
 
-0.005 
(0.67) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Latin America 
 
 
 
-0.00 
(0.11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Infant Mortality at start of period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.005 
(0.73) 
 
0.022 
(1.67) 
 
Life Expectancy at start of period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.019 
(0.59) 
 
0.081 
(0.95) 
 
Constant 
 
0.168 
(0.02) 
 
0.165 
(7.04) 
 
 
 
0.267 
(1.72) 
 
 
 
R2 
 
0.649 
 
0.738 
 
0.708 
 
0.695 
 
0.962 
 
SEE 
 
0.0248 
 
0.0216 
 
0.0233 
 
0.0233 
 
0.0174 
 
N 
 
309 
 
265 
 
145 
 
307 
 
254 
 
Notes: 1.  t-statistics in parentheses, OLS and Fixed Effect (FE).   
2.  The standard errors for the OLS estimates are adjusted for a random individual specific component. 
3.  Each regression includes three time dummies not reported here. 
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 TABLE 3 
 
Tests for Permanence and Trend of Aid/GNP Ratio  
 f = cte + f1*t 
 
 
Number of countries: 
 
 20 year trend 1971-90 
 
 10 year trend 1981-90 
 
with positive trend 
 
                   56 
 
                      57 
 
with negative trend 
 
                   35 
 
                      44   
 
of which aid predicted to be 
zero in: 
 
 
 
     
 
under 20 years 
 
                    19 
 
                      21  
 
20 - 50 years 
 
                      9 
 
                        5  
 
more than 50 years 
 
                      7 
 
                        8  
 
Estimates are reported for countries where there was at least 14 years of data available. 
 
The 20 and 10 year trends were statistically significant (5% level) in 66 countries and 48 
countries respectively.  The predictions were calculated by extrapolating aid based on the 
estimate for the trend and taking the initial level of assistance as the average assistance earned in 
the years 1988-90. 
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 TABLE 4 
 
The Impact of Foreign Aid on Macroeconomic Performance, Tax Rates 
and Human Development Indicators 
 
(The coefficients on foreign aid/GNP in alternative regressions,  
dependent variables are shown in the left column) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
 
     I 
 
    II 
 
    III 
 
   IV 
 
    V 
 
    VI 
 
   VII 
 
  VIII 
 
Total Consumption 
 
 
 1.016 
 (4.83) 
 
 1.048 
 (5.36) 
 
  1.015 
 (2.80) 
 
 1.038 
(3.19) 
 
  0.429 
 (5.17) 
 
 1.127 
 (3.67) 
 
 1.358 
 (4.48) 
 
 0.954 
(4.40) 
 
Private Consumption 
 
 
 0.232 
 (0.89) 
 
 0.329 
 (1.41) 
 
 0.260 
 (0.58) 
 
 0.332 
 (0.83) 
 
 0.101 
 (1.01) 
 
 0.345 
 (0.92) 
 
 0.151 
 (0.48) 
 
 0.577 
(2.67) 
 
Public and Private 
Investment 
 
 0.030 
 (0.17) 
 
  0.015 
 (0.09) 
 
 0.068 
 (0.23) 
 
 0.067 
 (0.25) 
 
 0.429 
 (5.17) 
 
 0.153 
 (0.62) 
 
 0.261 
 (1.01) 
 
 0.053 
(0.27) 
 
Government 
Consumption 
 
 0.784 
 (6.39) 
 
  0.719 
 (5.74) 
 
 0.755 
 (3.54) 
 
 0.707 
 (3.68) 
 
 0.327 
 (6.05) 
 
 0.782 
 (4.55) 
 
 1.207 
 (5.80) 
 
 0.377 
(3.18) 
 
Black Market 
Premium (%) 
 
 0.029 
 (0.82) 
 
 0.009 
 (0.28) 
 
  0.001 
 (0.02) 
 
-0.035 
 (0.59) 
 
 0.021 
 (1.32) 
 
 0.097 
 (1.84) 
 
   NA 
 
  NA 
 
Indirect Taxes 
 
 
-0.034 
 (0.22) 
 
-0.115 
 (0.79) 
 
-0.007 
 (0.03) 
 
-0.045 
 (0.18) 
 
-0.004 
 (0.07) 
 
 0.092 
 (0.38) 
 
-0.384 
 (1.58) 
 
 0.171 
(1.27) 
 
Inflation Tax 
 
 
 0.395 
 (0.15) 
 
-0.256 
 (0.11) 
 
-6.986 
 (1.52) 
 
-7.633 
 (1.83) 
 
 0.095 
 (0.10) 
 
 2.298 
 (0.61) 
 
 0.086 
 (0.01) 
 
 24.42 
(1.76) 
 
Change in Log Infant 
Mortality 
 
 -0.202 
 (0.42) 
 
-0.107 
 (0.24) 
 
-0.264 
 (0.30) 
 
-0.356 
 (0.45) 
 
-0.242 
 (1.35) 
 
-0.888 
 (1.24) 
 
 0.061 
 (0.14) 
 
 0.165 
(0.61) 
 
Change in Life 
Expectancy 
 
 -0.024 
 (0.29) 
 
-0.006 
 (0.08) 
 
 0.066 
 (0.47) 
 
 0.061 
 (0.47) 
 
 0.020 
 (0.58) 
 
 0.186 
 (1.71) 
 
 0.035 
 (0.20) 
 
 0.079 
(1.38) 
 
Change in Log  Primary 
Schooling  
 
 -0.688 
 (1.30) 
 
-1.144 
 (1.94) 
 
-1.52 
 (1.46) 
 
-0.993 
 (1.11) 
 
 -0.148 
 (0.68) 
 
-0.663 
 (0.89) 
 
  NA 
 
  NA 
 
Regressions are as follows: 
I. OLS with t-statistics adjusted for country specific random effect, ten year averaged data with RHS variables as in 
Table 5. 
II. OLS with t-statistics adjusted for country specific random effect , ten year averaged data with RHS variables:  
LGNPCAP, regional dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America, and one time dummy. 
III. IV estimates, ten year averaged data, with regressors as in I, and log of population as an instrument for AID. 
IV.  IV estimates, ten year averaged data, with regressors as in I, and political proxies "friends of US", "friends of OPEC", 
 "friends of France" and log of population as instruments for aid. 
V. IV estimates, ten year averaged data, in the FULL SAMPLE including countries with aid/GNP ratios greater than 
0.15.  Regressors as in I above. 
VI. IV estimates, ten year averaged data, including only those observations with aid/GNP ratios less than 0.10.  
Regressors as in I above. 
VII. IV estimates, five year averaged data, in the BASE sample with regressors as in I and twice-lagged aid as an 
instrument. 
VIII. Fixed effects estimator, BASE sample, with regressors as in I. 
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 TABLE 5 
Regressions Showing the Impact of Aid on Consumption,  
Investment, Taxes and Infant Mortality 
(panel data using base sample with decade-averaged data 1971-80,81-90) 
 
 
 
I 
 
II 
 
III 
 
IV 
 
V 
 
VI 
 
VII 
 
Dependent Variable: 
 
 
RHS variable: 
 
Public& 
Private 
Cons. 
GNP 
 
Invest- 
ment 
GNP 
 
Indirect 
Taxes 
GNP 
 
Inflation 
Tax 
Rate 
 
∆log 
Infant 
Mortal- 
ity 
 
∆log 
Life 
Expec-
tancy 
 
∆log 
PrimarySc
hool- 
ing  
 
AID/GNP 
 
 
1.016 
(4.83) 
 
0.030 
(0.17) 
 
-0.034 
(0.22) 
 
0.395 
(0.15) 
 
-0.202 
(0.42) 
 
-0.024 
(0.29) 
 
-0.688 
(1.30) 
 
LGNPCAP 
 
-0.098 
(2.54) 
 
0.035 
(1.06) 
 
-0.068 
(2.63) 
 
-0.320 
(0.67) 
 
0.034 
(0.32) 
 
-0.005 
(0.31) 
 
-0.212 
(2.17) 
 
LGNPCAP2 
 
 
-0.007 
(1.17) 
 
-0.002 
(0.44) 
 
-0.014 
(3.10) 
 
-0.051 
(0.64) 
 
0.018 
(1.04) 
 
-0.004 
(1.28) 
 
-0.041 
(2.40) 
 
Per capita GNP growth 
rate 
 
-0.076 
(3.03) 
 
0.873 
(4.12) 
 
0.173 
(1.01) 
 
-7.778 
(2.51) 
 
-0.563 
(0.97) 
 
0.076 
(0.76) 
 
1.254 
(1.90) 
 
Population growth rate 
 
 
-1.931 
(2.17) 
 
1.988 
(2.66) 
 
0.482 
(0.76) 
 
-22.00 
(2.04) 
 
4.449 
(2.00) 
 
-0.072 
(0.18) 
 
0.667 
(0.30) 
 
Terms of Trade 
  
 
0.105 
(0.27) 
 
-0.168 
(0.53) 
 
-0.310 
(1.29) 
 
1.724 
(0.37) 
 
0.200 
(0.23) 
 
0.089 
(0.59) 
 
4.198 
(4.28) 
 
Debt Rescheduling 
 
 
-0.008 
(0.48) 
 
0.003 
(0.26) 
 
-0.027 
(2.05) 
 
0.240 
(1.14) 
 
0.040 
(1.02) 
 
-0.005 
(0.78) 
 
-0.014 
(0.34) 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
-0.033 
(1.74) 
 
-0.007 
(0.44) 
 
0.022 
(1.60) 
 
-0.006 
(0.03) 
 
0.062 
(1.44) 
 
-0.028 
(3.40) 
 
0.062 
(1.31) 
 
Asia 
 
 
-0.061 
(2.91) 
 
0.021 
(1.17) 
 
0.003 
(0.18) 
 
0.150 
(0.59) 
 
-0.010 
(0.20) 
 
0.002 
(0.30) 
 
0.047 
(0.90) 
 
Latin America 
 
 
0.017 
(0.99) 
 
-0.040 
(2.86) 
 
-0.007 
(0.58) 
 
0.739 
(3.67) 
 
0.015 
(0.38) 
 
0.002 
(0.24) 
 
0.034 
(0.84) 
 
log (Dependent variable at 
start of period) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.001 
(11.1) 
 
1.101 
(6.38) 
 
0.865 
(7.53) 
 
Level of Dependent variable 
at start of period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
(0.13) 
 
-0.006 
(1.78) 
 
-0.003 
(1.68) 
 
Time 
 
 
-0.021 
(1.38) 
 
0.012 
(0.95) 
 
-0.011 
(0.95) 
 
-0.033 
(0.17) 
 
-0.016 
(0.45) 
 
0.004 
(0.67) 
 
-0.005 
(0.12) 
 
Constant 
 
 
0.670 
(12.5) 
 
0.296 
(6.56) 
 
0.017 
(0.50) 
 
0.255 
(0.39) 
 
-0.487 
(2.10) 
 
0.007 
(0.01) 
 
0.693 
(1.99) 
 
R2 
 
0.615 
 
0.463 
 
0.207 
 
0.273 
 
0.963 
 
0.980 
 
0.869 
 
SEE 
 
0.063 
 
0.053 
 
0.040 
 
0.780 
 
0.145 
 
0.025 
 
0.148 
 
N 
 
123 
 
123 
 
101 
 
123 
 
123 
 
123 
 
105 
 
  47 
Notes: 1. Ols estimates, t-statistics in parentheses,  standard errors are adjusted for a random individual 
specific component. 
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 TABLE 6 
 
t-Statistics from Robustness Tests for Each Donors Aid 
  
(test of the null hypothesis that each donor's aid has 
the same impact as aid from other donors)  
 
 
 
 
    Multi- 
    lateral 
 
    
United 
     States 
 
    OPEC 
 
    
France 
 
    Japan 
 
  United 
 
Kingdo
m 
 
Total Consumption 
 
 0.15 
 
-0.34 
 
  1.69* 
 
 0.17 
 
-0.39 
 
-0.36 
 
Private Consumption 
 
  1.77* 
 
 0.21 
 
 0.54 
 
 0.54  
 
 0.67 
 
-0.83 
 
Investment 
 
-1.09 
 
 0.32 
 
 -1.74* 
 
 1.01 
 
-1.09 
 
 0.60 
 
Public Consumption 
 
   -
3.57*** 
 
-1.04 
 
  1.74* 
 
-0.87 
 
  -2.12** 
 
 1.14 
 
Black Market Premium 
 
-0.92 
 
-0.86 
 
0.46 
 
-1.64 
 
-1.07 
 
0.66 
 
Indirect Taxes 
 
 1.26 
 
-1.21 
 
-0.40  
 
 0.01 
 
-0.92  
 
 1.42 
 
Inflation Tax 
 
-0.21 
 
  -2.76*** 
 
 0.52 
 
-0.65 
 
-1.08 
 
 0.71 
 
∆log(Infant Mortality) 
 
 -0.64   
 
 0.06 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.24 
 
-0.22 
 
 0.53 
 
∆log(Life Expectancy) 
 
-0.47 
 
    2.99*** 
 
-0.30 
 
-0.83 
 
-0.48 
 
 0.62 
 
∆log(Primary Schooling) 
 
-1.90 
 
 0.62 
 
-1.21 
 
-1.07 
 
 0.68 
 
 1.22 
 
Notes to Table: 
 
***:  significant at 1% level 
 
** :  significant at 5% level 
 
*  :  significant at 10% level 
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 TABLE 7 
 
The Impact of Foreign Aid Allowing for Differences in Political Regimes  
and Political Liberties 
 
(The table reports the coefficient on the political regime variable and political 
regime interacted with Foreign Aid/GNP 
in alternative regression equations) 
 
 
Measure of the Political 
Regime: 
 
Index of Political Liberties 
(dummy variable from .14 to 1) 
 
Liberal Democracies 
(dummy =1 if democratic) 
 
 
 
Own effect 
 
 
Interaction 
with Foreign 
Aid/GNP 
 
Own Effect 
 
Interaction 
with Foreign 
Aid/GNP 
 
Dependent Variable: 
 
  I 
 
    II 
 
    III 
 
   IV 
 
 
Total Consumption 
 
 
0.038 
(0.99) 
 
0.583 
(0.81) 
 
0.003 
(0.14) 
 
0.253 
(0.62) 
 
Private Consumption 
 
 
0.044 
(0.94) 
 
0.771 
(0.87) 
 
0.008 
(0.33) 
 
0.303 
(0.60) 
 
Public and Private 
Investment 
 
-0.046 
(1.42) 
 
-0.055 
(0.09) 
 
-0.010 
(0.57) 
 
0.059 
(0.17) 
 
Government 
Consumption 
 
-0.006 
(0.27) 
 
-0.188 
(0.44) 
 
-0.005 
(0.45) 
 
-0.051 
(0.21) 
 
Black Market 
Premium 
 
-0.006 
(0.87) 
 
0.045 
(0.38) 
 
0.014 
(0.04) 
 
-0.036 
(0.54) 
 
Indirect Taxes 
 
 
-0.009 
(0.35) 
 
-0.022 
(0.04) 
 
-0.009 
(0.65) 
 
0.088 
(0.31) 
 
Inflation Tax 
 
 
-0.135 
(0.28) 
 
-3.450 
(0.386) 
 
-0.322 
(1.29) 
 
0.874 
(0.18) 
 
Change in Log Infant 
Mortality 
 
-0.154 
(1.74) 
 
1.782 
(1.08) 
 
-0.066 
(1.41) 
 
0.0735 
(0.77) 
 
Change in Log Life 
Expectancy 
 
0.010 
(0.62) 
 
0.030 
(0.10) 
 
0.006 
(0.79) 
 
0.075 
(0.44) 
 
Change in Log  Primary 
Schooling  
 
-0.044 
(0.44) 
 
1.209 
(0.64) 
 
-0.036 
(0.68) 
 
1.121 
(0.88) 
 
Notes to table: 1. t-statistics reported in parentheses, standard errors are adjusted for a country 
specific random effect. 
2.  Each regression has right hand side variables as in Table 5 plus the political 
regime proxy and an interaction term formed by multiplying the political regime 
proxy by the aid/GNP ratio. 
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 TABLE 8 
Regressions Showing the Relation Between Political Regimes 
 and Infant Mortality 
Dependent variable:  Log (Infant Mortality) 
(panel data using decade averaged data 1971-80,81-90) 
 
Variable: 
 
ALL 
 
ALL 
 
Exc Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
Exc 
Asia 
 
Exc Latin 
America 
 
 
 
I 
 
II 
 
III 
 
IV 
 
V 
 
Political Rights Indicator 
 
 
 
 
-0.343 
(3.06) 
 
-0.378 
(2.69) 
 
-0.409 
(3.62) 
 
-0.283 
(2.11) 
 
Democratic Regime 
 
 
-0.328 
(4.62) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Socialist Regime 
 
 
-0.203 
(2.40) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Military Authoritarian and Other 
 
 
-0.146 
(1.88) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LGNPCAP 
 
 
-0.556 
(3.53) 
 
-0.676 
(4.23) 
 
-0.616 
(2.82) 
 
-0.567 
(2.96) 
 
-0.694 
(4.18) 
 
LGNPCAP" 
 
 
-0.020 
(0.96) 
 
-0.041 
(1.62) 
 
-0.026 
(0.69) 
 
-0.030 
(1.01) 
 
-0.044 
(1.68) 
 
Per capita GNP growth rate 
 
 
-2.996 
(3.17) 
 
-3.665 
(3.76) 
 
-3.725 
(2.72) 
 
-3.637 
(3.45) 
 
-3.509 
(3.44) 
 
Population growth rate 
 
 
24.45 
(6.79) 
 
22.97 
(6.14) 
 
24.57 
(5.11) 
 
22.79 
(5.92) 
 
26.70 
(6.12) 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
0.048 
(0.56) 
 
-0.052 
(0.64) 
 
NA 
 
-0.017 
(0.20) 
 
-0.079 
(0.98) 
 
Asia 
 
 
-0.327 
(4.07) 
 
-0.355 
(4.32) 
 
-0.386 
(4.19) 
 
NA 
 
-0.362 
(4.48) 
 
Latin America 
 
 
-0.198 
(2.66) 
 
-0.151 
(2.00) 
 
-0.153 
(1.85) 
 
-0.149 
(2.02) 
 
NA 
 
Time 
(1971-1980=1) 
 
0.201 
(3.95) 
 
0.200 
(3.76) 
 
0.213 
(7.43) 
 
0.242 
(4.21) 
 
0.184 
(3.30) 
 
Constant 
 
2.35 
(10.3) 
 
2.20 
(9.40) 
 
2.22 
(7.43) 
 
2.40 
(8.64) 
 
2.08 
(8.63) 
 
R2 
 
0.827 
 
0.813 
 
0.764 
 
0.813 
 
0.838 
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SEE 0.294 0.303 0.329 0.291 0.294 
 
N 
 
151 
 
151 
 
92 
 
125 
 
119 
 
Notes: 1. t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors are adjusted for a country specific random component. 
 FIGURE 1 
 
 Average Aid/GNP and Average Per Capita Growth 
 (Base Sample, 1971-1990) 
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 FIGURE 2A 
 Optimal Distortions under Alternative Political Regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FIGURE 2B 
 The Impact of Aid on Distortions under Alternative Political Regimes 
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 FIGURE 3 
 
 Nations=s Relative Incomes and Political Represenativeness 
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 FIGURE 4 
 
 CPR Plot of the Improvement in Infant Mortality and Aid/GNP Ratios 
 using the Base Sample of Countries 
 (20 year averaged data:  1971-90) 
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1. Sundrum (1992) page 74. 
2. These authors go much further.  Both argue that poverty reflects 
harmful political regimes that introduce distortionary policies for the 
benefits of a narrow political elite.  Foreign aid can actually cause a 
poverty trap if it strengthens these governments so they can stay in 
power. 
3. Bayart (1992) page 88. 
4. Krieger (1992) page 730.  
5. As shown in Table 1, three quarters of foreign aid is provided by 
bilateral donors and this rarely has policy conditionality attached.  IMF 
loans and World Bank loans are sometimes conditional on major policy 
changes but the effectiveness of these restrictions is questionable.  This 
is particularly true over the sample period of my empirical work.  See eg 
Mosley et al (1991), Khan (1986).     
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6. This can be interpreted as an assumption about the separability of 
decision making.  If aid is given for political and strategic reasons, then 
the recipient=s choice of transfers, spending and tax policies may not be 
affected by any agreements that are reached over reciprocal political and 
strategic support.   
7. In reality there are many tax and expenditures that governments do 
target.  There is a well known bias for many governments to provide 
relatively expensive health care services, tertiary education, etc, before 
meeting basic need for literacy and primary health services.  Likewise 
taxes can be waived or reduced for particular groups.  My assumption 
effectively restricts the range of public goods and taxes which this 
problem would capture.  Since most distortionary tax policies have 
substantial spillover effects in general equilibrium, or they cannot be 
easily targeted to particular individuals, I believe such policies are bound 
to spillover into macroeconomic distortions at the national level.  
Likewise many public services such as roads, defense, and the benefits 
of sanitation cannot be targeted to particular groups. 
8. I also rule out expropriation beyond choice of an income tax.  
9. Since each individual in the political elite is identical, this is just 
the (1-s*)ls. 
10. Some people argue that aid promotes other capital inflows.  If this 
is true then consumption and investment would rise by more than one 
dollar for each dollar of aid, and the sum of the coefficients on aid in 
equations (16) and (17) would be less than one.    
11. See Caldwell (1986), Dreze and Sen (1982) and Flegg (1982) for 
evidence on the determinants of infant mortality, and the past success of 
government programs to improve health care and reduce infant 
mortality.  The main reason I express (18) in differences rather than 
levels is that at the start of the 1970s there was no correlation between 
aid flows and health indicators B in order to determine whether higher 
aid receipts lead to improvements in these indicators I have to examine 
changes over time.  
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12. Pack and Pack (1993) and Khilji and Zampelli (1991) found that 
governments were able to, ex-post, fully redirect expenditures agreed to 
under aid programs to alternative uses.   Pack and Pack (1990) found that 
aid flows were not fungible in Indonesia, and they concluded that this 
was due to the large amounts concerned.  
13.  Guyana's current account deficit averaged 41% of GDP between 
1981 and 1990.  This was seven standard deviations from the mean for 
all countries in the base sample.  Gabon's average propensity to consume 
was 0.48 between 1971-80, which was four standard deviations from the 
mean.  This is due to an investment boom between 1974 and 1977 when 
investment is recorded at two thirds of GNP, but investment falls sharply 
to 30% of GDP in 1978.  Real consumption falls by 50% from 1976 to 
1978 (measured against 1978) which seems unreasonable given 
generally smooth patterns of consumption in theory and empirical data.  
Finally, infant mortality is recorded during some years at more than 1000 
per 1000 in Lesotho.  
 
14. The one exception to this is Trumbull and Wall (1994).  They 
present results using fixed effects estimators showing that aid is 
transferred to countries with high infant mortality indexes and high 
indexes of civil liberties.  I do not find results similar to theirs.  I suspect 
this is because they use annual data from 1986 to 1991 only.  The infant 
mortality indexes reported by the World Bank are based on infrequent 
surveys (varying but in the range of every five years).  They must 
extrapolate between survey dates.  Using fixed effects in short time 
intervals I suspect Trumbull and Wall may have substantial 
measurement problems since the within variance would be driven by 
extrapolations from the last survey.  They find similar results to mine 
and the other authors listed above in OLS regressions.    
15. It is possible that the correlation between population and the 
aid/GNP ratio is spurious.  This could occur because I am dividing aid 
by population and income per capita in order to get the aid/GNP ratio, 
and then regressing this ratio on population.  Since population enters the 
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denominator of the left hand side variable and is also an independent 
variable, I risk creating a spurious correlation.  To be sure that this was 
not driving the negative correlation I also ran a regression of the log of 
aid on the log of population, log of GNP per capita and time dummies.  
The coefficient on population was .052 and significant at the 1% level in 
the full sample.  Using sample averages of the data, this implies a 1% 
rise in population reduces the aid/GNP ratio by .035.  This is similar to 
the findings reported in Table 2, and hence verifies that the correlation 
between the aid/GNP ratio and population is not spurious.    
16. For example, if a temporary burst in government spending raises 
the relative price of non-tradable goods, then the aid/GNP ratio will fall 
since foreign currency aid receipts are unlikely to be correlated with 
temporary government spending.  When the economy returns to 
sustainable levels of government spending, the aid/GNP ratio will rise.  
If such government spending also induces temporary increases in output, 
then a fiscal driven business cycle will cause a negative correlation 
between current aid and growth, but a positive correlation between 
lagged aid and growth. 
 
17. Table 4 column 2 shows the results are similar when I exclude all 
control variables except income per capita.  This provides a check 
against possible bias due to endogeneity of some of the right hand side 
variables.  As an alternative I could have reported (qualitatively similar) 
results where I instrument the potentially endogenous variables with 
lagged variables, but this would have been at the cost of one set of 
observations.  
18. The countries are Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde Island, Central 
African Republic, Gambia, Guinea-Bisseau, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania (2 
observations), Papau New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Somalia and 
Tanzania.  
19. In this dataset the impact of aid on investment is insignificant once 
I exclude those countries that receive more than 15% of GNP.  I can't 
determine whether this is due to a country size effect or the level of aid 
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receipts since both are highly correlated in my sample.   
20. This is an important difference between my findings and previous 
research which has not explicitly taken into account aid fungibility.  For 
example Levy (1987)  finds that the propensity to invest from anticipated 
aid is higher than the propensity to invest from unanticipated aid, but 
since he used commitments to construct anticipated aid flows, I suspect 
he is capturing aid committed to infrastructure and other investment 
projects that are planned several years in advance.  In OLS regressions 
using actual aid flows he finds the marginal propensity to consume from 
aid is 0.73.  But Levy (1987, 1988) and many of the early papers 
including Griffin (1972) did not attempt to instrument foreign aid, so it 
was unclear whether their results were biased.  Mosley et al (1987) 
provide a careful discussion of the importance of instruments when they 
examine the relation between aid and growth. 
21. In the regressions excluding these countries the coefficient on total 
consumption was 0.93 (t-statistic 4.17) and investment was 0.05 (t-
statistic 0.27). 
22. It is possible that aid channeled through the government could be 
used differently than aid distributed through the private sector.  To test 
whether aid not channeled through the government was used differently, 
 I divided the data into two subsamples of high and low spending 
governments.  Low spending governments are observations where the 
government spending ratio was  less than the median.  In this subsample 
the coefficient on private consumption rose to 1.02 (t-statistic 2.52) 
while the coefficient on government consumption fell to  0.08 (t-statistic 
0.71).  The respective coefficients for high spending governments were 
0.18 (t-statistic 0.47) and 0.52 (t-statistic 2.9).  In each case the 
coefficient on investment was insignificant and small, while the 
coefficient on total consumption was insignificantly different from one. 
23. Sundrum (1992) page 74, Table 4.1, line 2. 
24. A regression of infant mortality on income predicts that a 10% rise 
in GNP causes a 5% decline in infant mortality.    
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25. See Caldwell (1986) and Dreze and Sen (1982) for discussions of 
the past success of government programs to improve health care and 
reduce infant mortality.  The World Bank (1993) estimates that low 
income countries would need to spend 3.1% of GNP to lower infant 
mortality and raise life expectancy to near western levels.  This can be 
achieved through increased public health facilities, better sanitation, 
improved literacy (especially maternal literacy), and nationwide 
vaccination programs.  Since these costs are well within average aid 
receipts of my sample of countries, and well within their own fiscal 
constraints, failure to achieve better human development conditions must 
be attributed largely to government failure.   
26. These results do not change if I interact political variables with all 
right hand side variables.  For example, using the Derbyshire and 
Derbyshire index, the coefficients on the interaction terms with foreign 
aid in these regressions were: total consumption (.015), investment 
(.213) and on infant mortality (.67).  The t-statistics were 0.0, 0.4, and 
1.1 respectively.   
27. Barro (1994) forecasts democratization of countries.  He runs 
regressions of political liberties on life expectancy (and other RHS 
variables) and finds a positive correlation.  He interprets this positive 
correlation as evidence that households demand liberties as their 
standard of living increases, ie democracy is a luxury good.  Since I'm 
controlling for standard of living as measured by income, I suspect this 
correlation is at least in part driven by a higher propensity for democratic 
governments to redistribute.  This matches theory and empirical 
evidence in Persson and Tabellini (1994).    
